





uals，they are not at allas powerfulas mayors who also are directly  
electedbythesamemunicIPalvoters．Theyare，however，Stillimportant  
actorsinlocalpoliticsandadministration．Firstofall，anybill，eitherof  
budget or of by－1aw，muSt be approved by the municipalcouncilto be  
enacted．Duringasession，aCOunCilhastherighttomakethemayorand  
his officers answer any questions related tolocalselfTgOVernment．A  
COunCilis，thus．aninstitutionalizedorgantocheckmayoralprograms，if  
notinitiatethem，and，aSSuCh，affectslocalpolicy－makingprocesstosome  
extent．   
Second，COunCilorsarethepoliticiansclosesttoordinarycitizens．This  
means they are accessible tolocalpeople．Thelatter，thus，may take  
misce】1aneousdemandsandcomplaintsaboutmuniclpaladministrationto  
their councilors，eXpeCting them to make the city halllisten to their  
VOices．Councilors areintermediaries between TeSidents and municipal  
administrators，andcontributeto keepmunicipalgovernments sensitive  
toneedsrisingfromlocaldailylife．   
Theroleofcounci］orsisnotconfinedtothelocalscene．InJapan，yOu  
wi11findpoliticala】1iancesamongpoliticiansfrom differentlevels．Itis  
Widelyheld that those alliances，eSpeCially those of conservative politi－  
Cians，playabigroleinelectoralanddistributivepolitics．Eachcouncil（〕r  
is tied up with a particular Dietman of the Liberal Democratic Party 
（LDP）．especiallyamemberoftheHouseofRepresentatives（HR）whois  




politicalnetworks．   
Afterall，munlClpalcouncilorsareseenasplaylng animportantrolein  
the nationalpoliticalsystem as wellaslocalone．But there are few  
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Studiesaboutpoliticalallianceamongpoliticiansfromdifferentlevels，by  
COntraSt tO the abundance of research concernlng COunCilors as actors  
Withinlocalpolitics．The purposeofthispaperis toimprovethissitua－  
tion，uSlnginformationderivedmainlyfrom questionnairesscntbackto  
us frommore Lhan2，200councilors ofOkayama and Kanagawa prefec－  
tures．   
Kanagawais next to Tokyo，and most ofitis high1y urbanized．  
Okayama，about four hundred mi1es west of Tokyo，COntains some  
middleTSized cities，but．most ofits munlCIPalities can be classified as  
rural．Thecombinationofthesetwoprefecturesmakesiteasiertodraw  
a nationwide pictureofpoliticala11iance．  
In this paper wc would like to argue mainly about alliances of the 
COnSerVativepoliticians．Itisinthiscampwhereanalliancephenomenon  








label．   
Beingindependentdoesnotmean．however，eitherideologlCalindiffer－  





todistinguishLDPcouncilorsandconscrvativeindependents，   
Thisfactalsotcllsusthatformalpartymembershipdoesnotplayabig  
roleinconnectingcouncilorstoLDPDietmen．lnfact，theLDPdoes not  
havemassive and wellstructured party organization on thelocallevel．  
Councilor・Dietmen relations are formed personally，nOt throughformal  
PartyaCtivities．  
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Personalalliance between politiciansis usually believed to take a  
Pyramidalshape．AtthetopofanalliancenetworkcomesaDietman．He  
OrShehassevcralmembersofprefecture assemblyandsomemayorsas  
his／herfollowers．Eachmemberofprefectureassembly，inturn，aCquires  
their own closest subjects from municipalcouncilors．Councilors，then．  
Organizelocalnotablessuchasthechairmanofalocalyouthassociation．  
the post master，alocalindustrialist，the president of volunteer fire  
fighter association，and so on．In such an alliance，a higher echelonis  
expectedto takecare ofitssubordinates，andthelatter mobilizevoters  
for the former．   
Generallyspeaking，itisarguedthatsuchahierarchicalmutualassis－  
tancesystem emerged from post war upheavaloflocalpoliticalscene．  
Beforethewar，SemiLfeudalisticlandlordshadstrongholdonruralpeople，  
and pre－WarJapan was basically a ruralcountry．Many voters could  
easily be mobilized for their pet politicians of conservative parties．In  
manycases，1andlords themselvestook seats of villagecouncils，prefec－  
ture assemblies，andtheIIouseof Representatives．Politicalparties did  
IIUtneedtodevelopwellstructuredorganizationstoconveytheirvoices  
directlyto voters．   
The defeatin the war，however，forcedJapan to undergo various  
massivechanges．Needlesstosay，localpowerstructurewasseriouslyhit  
bygustsofwind．Agriculturalreform confiscated ricepaddies ofland－  
lords，distributing them to poorpeasants almost free of charge．Doing  
that，thereformdeprivedlandloadsofpoliticalaswellaseconomicpower  




it possible for ambitious people to seek political support among local 
VOterSforthemselves，thatis，Withoutbeingsensitivetothewi11soflocal  
notableslikeinfluentiallandlords．Masumicalled those beneficiaries of  
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SuppOrtedthemi1itaristicgovernmentduringthewarwereexpelledfrom  
the politicalscene．Here，tOO，the politicalvacuum was soon filledwith  
newpowerseekers，mOStOfwhomwereaffiliatedwithoneofthreenewly  
formed conservativeparties，Or，iftheyidentifiedthemselvesasprogres－  
Sive，withthebrand newJapanSocialistParty．   
A1lof those parties were what Duverge called”cadre parties”：they  
lacked both struCtured organizations and mass membership．TheJSP  
SOOn found mass organizations which were swe11ing outside the party，  
thatis，1abor unions，Very reliable．Ry contrast，there were no similar  
mass organization available to conservative parties．Agricultural  
COOperativesdidlook attractivetothem．Butsincethelawrequiredthe  
COOperativesto keep politicalneuしrality，theycould not be consplCuOuS  
actorsinthepoliticalscene，atleastofficially．Moreover，duetoJapanese  
multi－member－district election system，COnSerVative politicians were  
forced to vie witheachother fiercely for conservative voters．To each  
conservativepoliticiaIl，then，Otherpoliticianofthesamecampashis／her  
OWn Were principalrivals．This situation did not change at allafter  
COmpetingpartiesweremergedintothe LDPin1955．   
Veryearlyin the post war era，the residue of supportersIoyalto，Or  
ObedieIlt tO，OuSted Dictmen were often bequeathed to their postwar  
successors．But thelattercouldnot havereliedheavi1y onsuchafading  
constituencyforlong；theyhadtofindsomesubstitutes forthem．What  
most ofthemfound attractiveand usefulwasIocalpoliticians．Dietmcn  
and would－beDietmeninvited members ofthe prefecture assembly and  
munlClpalcouncilors to join their kei77？ねus，eXClusive networkswith  
hierarchicalstruCtureS．Localpoliticians，along with some otherlocal  
influentialpersons，Were eXpeCted toperSuade their own supporters to  
VOtefortheirbossl）ietmen，eVenifthosesupportersdidnothaveenough  




alarge scale ofimmigration occurred；Millions ofpeOpleleft rural  
Vi11agesandsmalltownsforindustrialandcomrnercialcities，abandoning  
agriculture．Many of those who stayedin ruralareas also gradually  
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Startedcommutingtofactoriesandofficesinnearcities．Suchincreasing  
mobilityinruralareaserodedoldsocialnetworkswhichlocalpoliticians  
tended to rely on to secure unconditionalloyalty to them fromlocal  
voters2）．  
In many urbanized areas，On the other hand，neWCOmerS from rural  
areas and their offspringbecamc the majority．Those newcomers often  
began theirurbanlifeincheap．narrow．and often uncomfortableapart－  
ments，and then moved tobetter housing．Many born－in－the－City people  
themselvesbegantomoveto suburbanareas，eVenif theycolltilluedto  
WOrkin centralcities．In urbanized areaslike Tokyo，thus，it became  
more and more difficult for local politicians to keep voters within the 
realm of theirinfluence．   
Besides the elusiveness of voters，the development of mass media，  
improvement of materiallife，the enlargement of population enjoyjng  




areas than ruralones．   






COnSerVativepoliticians，firstinurban areas，theninruralareas．   




kaiis a mass organizationin which each voter enjoys basically equal  
membership．Whatisimpor・tant hereis that the associatiollitself．not  
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localpoliticiansorotherinfluentialpersons，makesvoterswritethename  
Ofthepolitician ontheba1lot．   
Turnlngbacktoourargument，however，koenkaidoesnotexcludelocal  
politiciansfromitsorganization．Usually，anationalpoliticianaskslocal  
POliticians who areinhis camp to participatein their koenkais．Local  




anationalpoliticianwhentheformerisamemberofthelatter’skeirefsu．   
Howubiquitous，then，iskeirefsuaffiliation？Wedidnotaskcouncilors  
iftheyjoined a Dietman’skeirefsuornotbecausesuchaquestionmight  
haveglVenthemanimpressionthattheyweresubjugatedtotheDietman．  
Instead，We aSked themif theyjoined any koenkaiofa Dietman，andif  
theytookimportantpositionsinthatkoenkat．   
Tablesl－1andl－2showhowmanycouncilorsareenrolledinDietmen’s  
koenkaisinOkayama andKanagawaprefecturerespectively，Classifying  
municipalitiesbytheirpopulationsize．Generallyspeaking，thebiggerthe  
population sizeof a municipalityis，themorethemunicipalityisurban－  
jzedinJapan∴Kanagawa，OneOfthemosthigh】yurbanizedprefecturesin  
Japan，has two cities whose populationis more than one million．  
Okayama has two cities whose population is around five hundred 
thounand，buttherestaremiddle－Sizedandsmall－Sizedcitiesandvi11ages．  
In Okayama，nealy forty percent of councilors hold some postslike  
branchmanagerofkoenkais．Playingsomeofficialroleinakoenkaican  
beconstruedashis／herstrongcommitmenttotheDietmanbecauseitis  
time consuming，eSPeCia11y during election time，and publicizes his／her  
commitmenttoaparticularcamp．Ahalfofconcilorsare，however，mere  
JOlnerS．Thatis，theyputtheirnamesonthelistofparticularkoenkais，but  





arepositiveto koenkaiactivities．Inmiddlc－andsmall－Sizedmunicipali－  
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ties，thesituationissimilartotheoneinOkayama．Whatisoutstanding  
inKanagawais thebiggerpercentageofnon－JOlnerS．Inthe twobiggest  
Cities，eSpeCially，about thirty percent of conucilors do not have any  
Dietman’s koe71kais to be affiliatedwith．In those cities，COunCilors are  
veryprestigious，anditmaybenaturalthatsomewanttobeindependent  
from any authority．   
After all，eighty to ninety percent of conservative councilors are  
affiliated withDietmen．This maylook amazing at a glance，but more  
thanahalfofthosecouncilorsseemtobenominalmembersofDietmen’s  
koe71kai．Besides aconsiderablenumberofnominaljoiners，thereareten  
to twenty percent of non－joiners．Ifitisinconceivable that there are  




ment．Itis they that make coalition among politicians from different  
levelssignificant andoutstandinginJapan．   
Whendocouncilors，then，joinnationalpoliticians’keiretsus？Table2－1  
and2－2show that theprobabiliLy ofjoining a keiretsuincreasesslightly  
alongwiththelengthofexperienceasacouncilor．I3utmoreimportantis  
that around eighty percent of concilors become members of keirefsus  
duringtheirfirstterminbothprefectures．Itisnotcouncilors’sexperience  
andskillfulness，OranyOtherpersonalvirtuesthatleadthemtoDietmen’s  
Camp．In most cases，the mere fact that they are elected councilorsis  
takeninto account．  
Joining a Dietman’scamp，however，doesnotnecessrily mean strong  
COmmitment．In Okayama，about a half of councilors do not play any  
activerolesintheir］eaders’koenkaisevenintheirthirdterm．InKanag，  
awa，theproportionofcouncilorswhoholdsome postsinkoenkaisgoes  
upfromthirtyfourpercentinthefirsttermtofortysevenpercentinthe  
third term，but one third of councilorsin their third term stillremain  
Weaklycommittedtokoenkais．Thesedatashowthatsomecouncilorsare  
positivelyinvoIvcdinDietmen’skd7V／sufromtheverybeginningoftheir  
lifeinmunicipalcouncilswhile thosewhostartwith weak commitment  
arelikelytostaynominalintheirinvoIvementthroughouttheircarreer  
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as councilors．There are somewho continue to be mavericks，tOO．   
Thus far the argument has been about the static aspects of lzeiretsu 
phenomenon，Nextwewouldliketo seehowoftcncouncilorscomeinto  
COntaCt WithDietmen．Here，Variousways ofcontactare supposed，nOt  
COnfinedtodirectinterviewwithDietmen．Telephonecallandinterview  
with assistants ofDietnlen areincluded，tOO．   
Tables3－1and3・2show that the frequencyin Kanagawais slightly  
higher thanthatinOkayama．Thisis probablydue tothedifference of  
numbers of conservative councilors；Okayama has two tin1eS aS many  
COunCilorsasKanagawa．Thatis，thenumberofcouncilorsperDietman  
islargerinOkayamathaninKanagawa．   
But the differencein this polntis not verylarge．Moreinterestingis  
that positionholdersinkoel・lkai■tend to comeincontactwith Dietmen  
morefrequentlythanmereparticipants．Inbothprefectures，aboutthree  
fourth of position－holders contact Dietmen more than severaltimes a  
year．About forty percent of mere participants，by contrast，Seldom  
COntaCtDietmen．These figurescan beinterpreted to prove that taking  
responsibilitiesin koenka！smeanscloserrelationshipwithDietmen．   
Whatisembarrasingtousisthefactthatevensomeofnon・joinersof  
koenkaishowadegreeoffrequencyinwhichtheycomeintocontactwith  
Dietmen．Are there non－joiners who are stillenrolled on thelists of  
kei柁tSuS？Oraresomeinfluentialnon－joinerssometimcsinvitedb〉Tmany  
CamPSOfDietmen？Ourdatatellnothingaboutthispoint，But，fortunate－  
1y，Muramatsu seems to glVeuS a COnVincmg solution to our quention．  
Accordingtohisfindings，aCOunCilorsometimesrneetsDietmenwithhis／  
her colleagues of the standing committee he／she belongs toin the  
counci13）   
Localgovernmentsincessantly comein contact wiLh nationalpoliti－  




councilor does not meet a Dietman personally．but as one of official  
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delegates ofhis／herlocalgovcrnment．In fact，SuChgroups containnot  
Only councilorswith keiretsu affiliation but also non－joiners．Actually，  
membersofsuchdelegacyarechosenregardlessofanyaffiliation．Even  
COunCilors of non－COnSerVative parties are not discriminated，though  
COmmunistscanbesometimesexceptional．   
The length of service as a councilor also affects the frequcncy of 
COntaCt With Dietmen．Thelonger a councilorisin the post，the more  
Oftenhe／she tends tocomeincontactwith Dietmen．For one thing，an  
experiencedcouncilorismorelikelytoworkforanimportantcommittee  
Which tend tolobby Dietmen by sendingits delegates than a councilor  
withless experience because of the seniority system．For another，itis  
arguablethattimemakesrelationshipbetweenpoliticiansoftwolevels  
strongerandmorestable．IncontrastinEngland，itissaidthatcouncilors  
tend to detach themselves from members of Parliament as they get  








tion of keiretsuin a nationalelectioncampaignwi11bediscussed．  
InJapan，manyPOliticalscientistsaswellaspoliticiansthemselvestend  
toregard keiretsu asanindispensabledevicetomakeelectioncampaign  
effective．Wakata argues，for example，that a Dietman，eSPeCially a  
memberof House ofRepresentatives，uSuallyorganizeshis ownhuman  
networkconsistingmainlyofprefectureassemblymembers andmunici－  
palcoullCilorsasaninstrumenttopenetratethroughtheelectorateinhis  
district5）．Ishikawais another example；Itis prefecture assembly mem－  
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bers，munlCIPalcouncilors，andlower－rankedlocalnotables，Ishikawa  
SayS，that really boost nationalelection campaign．In his opinion，local  
politiciansandnotablesaskvotersundertheirowninfluencetovotefor  
their boss Dietmen6）．  
Inourresearch，WeaSkedcouncilorswhattheythinkofsuchopinions．  
Thequestionaskedin．’Towhatextentdoyouthinkcouncilorsmobilize  
voters for their favorite Dietmen，eSpeCially members of HR？”In the  
tables4－1and4－2theiranswersareclassifiedaccordingtothepopulation  
Size ofmunlClpalitjes．A g】ance at the tables shows us that thelarger  
musIClpalities are，the more highly councilors tend to estimate their  
abilityin voter mobilization．Tables5－1and5－2classify their answers  
accordisgtothepercentageoffarmers，1umberjacks，andfishermeninthe  
Whole working force．Itisinteresting that the same tendencyis seen  
among non－COnSerVative councilors’answers，thoughthe corresponding  
tables are omitted here．   
Ofcourse，Ourdata donot presenttheexactpictureofthecouncilors’  
roleinelectioncampaign onthenationa‖evel．Wedidnotask whether  
theythemselveshavesuchinfluence．Insteadweaskedabouttheirgeneral  
estimation，aSinsideinformants．In our opinion，mOSt Ofthemanswered  
thequestion，referrlngheavilyto thcirowsexperience．   





VOterS．Especiallyin Okayama，mOre than sixty percent of councilors  
from smallandleastindustrialized municipalities are negative to their  
influencein voter mobilization．   
Thiscontrastleadsustoanotherinferencethatconservativeconucilors  
get moreinvoIvedin electioncampaign to garnervotesfor theirleader  
Dietmenasthesupportfor the LDPdeclines．Tables6－1and6－2endorse  
ourinference；aStheLDPgotlessvotesinthe1983proportionalrepresen－  
tative election of the Upper House，mOre COunCilors became positive  
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toward theirinfluence overlocalvoters．   
Such findings obviously contradict what many people used to think  
abouttheroleofconservativeconucilorsinelectioncampaignbecausethe  
COnVentionalwisdom says that vote－gathering bylocalpoliticians for  
Dietmenis moreconsplCuOuSin ruralareas than urban areas．Itis not  
tenable that conservative Dietmen easilyget many votesinruralareas  
Withoutthehelpofcouncilorsbecausepeopleareconservativeenoughto  
VOte for a particu］ar LDP candidatewithout much consideration．The  
Strugglcwithintheconservativecampforvotesisasfierceinruralareas  
asinurbanareas．Nationalpoliticianscannotrclysimplyonthesupport  
for the conservative campin general．One must convert such general  
SuppOrtintosupportspecifiedforhimself．   
Ourresearchdoesnotdirectlyprovidethereasonforsuchacontradic－  
tion．But researchinOsaka Prefecture doIle by researchers of Kansai  
Universityseemstobesuggestive．Accordingtotheirfindings，COunCilors  
inhigh1yurbanizedareascontributetoDietmeninelection time mainly  
through managing and politicalactivities．They often work for their  
Dictmcn at campaign offices as directors or sub－directors．They also  
makespeechesonthestreetandinmeetingsforthcDietmentheysupport．  
OnlytwentyperCentOfcouncilorsmentionedthepersuasionoftheirown  
SuppOrterS tO Write the name of their boss Dietmen as their main  
contribution7）．   
Thefurtherurbanization advances，thelessexistingorganization and  
SOCialnetworksarereliablefornationa】politicians．Theyneedthcaidof  
experts in politics to grasp caprlClOuS VOterS．Andinlarge cities，  
COnuCilors are available as such experts．Some studies show that，aS  
urbanizationadvances，COunCilorstendtobecomefullTtime，PrOfessional  
politicians．Theyprobablyaremoreorlcssversedinorganizingelection  
Campalgn，and are good at developing policy－related statements and  
public－relationactivities．   
When they garner votes for theirleader po】iticians，they do not rely  
heavilyonthedirectpcrsuasionoftheirownfollowerstowriteparticular  
namesonvoting slips．The direct persuasionis stillhelpfulto national  
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of alocalpolitician with a particular nationalpolitician．Probably，  
councilors write recommendationletters for their L）ietmen on their tab－  
loidstobedistributedtothemembersoftheirownkoenkais．Buttheydo  
not do so as a parochialnotables，but rather as public relation agents．  
Theyalsointcrmediatefor variouslocalgroups theykeepcontactwith  
andtheirleaderpoliticians．Thoseactivitiesarenotveryefficient，butcan  
reach alargeextentofvoters．   
How many votes，then，dotheygatherforDietmen？TherelS，andwill  
be，nO Way Of estimatingtheexactnumber because ballotstellnothing  
aboutthat．Onepossiblewayofinferringistoaskvotersiftheyvotedfor  




7－1and7－2show the averagefiguresintheir answers．   
According to the tables，COnSerVative councilors of Yokohama and  
Kawasaki，thelargest citiesin Kanagawawith more than onemi11ion  
residents，gather more than four thousand votes for Dietmen．In four  
cities with around a half million residents，COunCilors mobilize around  
nine hundred voters．Itis obvious that these figures are not attainable  





ascertainthatwieldingpersonalinfluenceis a commonplace practicein  
ruralareas．   
The next subjectis whatimportance voter－mObilization activities of  
COunCilorshastonationalelections．Putin anotherway，thequestionis  
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how far the accumulation of votes by councilors for national Dietmen 
affectselectionresults．Manyelectionspecialists，OrWOuld－bespecialists，  
tend to see theinfluence as being enormous，An article of Mainichi  
Shimbun，forexample，affirmativelycitesanassertionofanoldassembly  
memberofaprefecture；heinsiststhatanylocalpoliticiancould“donate”  
a half of the votes he obtainedinthe previouslocalelection9）．Among  
thosewhoattachgreaterimportancetothecouncilors’voter－mObilization  
ability，SuChastatementisnotregardedasanoverestimation．   




either．   
After all，We areforced to makeroughcalculations，As a result，We  
estimatevotersmobilizedbycounci］orsasalittlelessthantenpercentin  
high1y urbanized areas，alittle more than ten percentin middle sized  
Cities，arOund fifteenpercentinmostruralareas．Thesefiguresarenot  
negligibleatall，butstilllooksmallcomparedtothoseoftensuggestedby  
the conventionalwisdom．   
Thisestimationdoesnotnecessarily，however，rejectthevalidityofthe  
COnVentionalwisdom complately．Theview thatlocalpoliticians can  
mobilizemanyvotersforDietmenwasformeddecadesago．Itisreasona－  
bletoconcludethatlocalpoliticiansoncedidhavetheabilitytomobilize  








life style of rural people has gotten closer and closer to that of urban 
people，making people have different values and opinions．Respect for  
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coucilorsitself has weakened．  
In urban arcas，eSpeCiallyin metropolitan ones，On the other hand，  
immigrantsfromruralareasandtheiroffspringhaveincreasedrapidly．  
Opinions and valuesinlarge cities are more divergent by nature，and  
SOCialbackground ofpeoplehasdiversifiedinfinitely．Moreover，peOple，  
immigrantsornot，tendtomoverepeatedlyforbetterhousingconditions．  
Ithasbecomemoreandmoredifficultforlocalpoliticianseventokeep  
mere contact with their voters．   
Anyway，COunCilors’influence over their supportersin voterr  
mobilization has shrunk considerablyin these decades．The number of  
COunCilors who engage themselvesin voter・mObilization has also de－  
CreaSed．Part of councilors’activities has．it seems，been succeeded by  
Other agents，SuCh as owners oflocalconstruction companies．Butitis  
probablyarguablethatthesignificanceofvoter－mObilizationactivitiesin  
generalismuchsmallernowadaysthaninolddays．Aspecialistofvoting  
behaviorsays thatanymobilizationhypothesisexplainslessthanthirty  
percentofelectionresultslO）．   
Whatis amazingis，however，thefact that some councilors stillcon・  
tinue to mobilize voters for Dietmen，and that ten some percent of the  







Why politicians of differentlevels share a keireisu？Reasons for the  
nationalpoliticians’sidelooksobvious，lnthefirstplace，electionusually  
entailsuncertainty．Thevotesawinningcandidategarneredintheprevi－  
ous election does not assure his／her reelection．To most candidates，  
10）JohjiWatanuki，＜’SenkyoDointoKohLhoshaYoin，’’inWatanuki，Miyake，Inogur  
Chi，andKabashimaeds．，Nihonjin no5buわ′O Kodo（TokYO：UniversityofTokyo  
Press，1986），eSp，p．147．  
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him votes which are difficult to be captured by the candidate himself，  
evenifthenumberofthevotesofferedisnotbig．Thisistheveryreason  
thatDietmenseek reliablecouncilors andtryto keeptheminhiscamp．   
Beside voter－mObilization，a Dietman willhave some other reasons to  
keepcouncilorsunderhisbannertFirst，aCOnuCilorcankeephisDietman  
informedaboutcommunityaffairs．ADietmanneedsvariouslocalinfor－  
mation to actin his districしThen he may need collaboratorsin a  
municipalconucilwhenhetrytogetsomenationalsubsidyofanational  
projectlikehighwayconstruCtionforthemunicipality．Obtainingbenefits  
from thenationalgovernmentforhisdistrictisoneofcommonwaysof  
appealingtovoters．Todothatsmoothly，itisconvenientforhimtohear  
formalvoices for such benefits from municlpalities．Councilors of his  
keiretsuwouldsinginchorusforhiminthecouncil．Finally，thenumber  
Of councilors joining his keireisu can be a symbolic expression of his  
influenceinamunicipalitywhereheisinaseverecompetitionwithrival  
Dietmen．   
MotivationsofacouncilortojointhecampofaparticularDietmanis  
not so self－eVident．Some peopleinsist that a councilor joins a camp  
becausehisjoiningitbringshimsomevotes．Accordingtothisargument，  
keireisuisanassociationofmutualvote－COntribution，andacouncilorcan  
expecthisDietmantoboosthisownelectioncampaign．   
Our data do not，however，SuPpOrt SuCh aview．We askedconucilors  
Whattheysawasmostimportanttowinthelastelection．Tables8－1and  
8－2show their answers．工n this case，LDP members andindependent  
conservativesaretreatedseparatelybecauseaidfromapoliticalpartyis  
meaningless to thelatter．   
They regard their own supporting organizations as most important 
bothinOkayamaandKanagawa．Thentheyrelyontheirownabilityand  
performance．Personalsupportersarealso regarded asreliable．Whatis  
interentingis，in thecontext of this article，that there are no councilors  
WhomentionedaidfromDietmen．TheydonotregardDietmen’saidfor  
them eveIlaS SeCOnd mostimportant，though the relevant data are  
J5  
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omitted her・e．   
Of course，this does not mean the absence of Dietmen’s aidinlocal  
election．Actua11y，OneOftenfindslettersofrecommendaしionfromDiet－  
menincampaignofficesofloca】electioncandidates．Sometimes，Dietmen  
make campalgn SpeeChes for councilors．But，aCCOrding to councilors’  
response，thesefavors do not seem effectiveinvotegatheringat all．It  
mustbenotedthateventhosecouncilorswhoholdhighpostsinDietmen’s  
SuppOrting associations，Or those who keep frequent contact with Diet－  
men，donotre】yonDietmenintheirownelectioncampaign，either．   




SO SeVere aS thatin nationalelection．But no politicianis exempt com－  
pletelyfromelectoraluncertainty．Itisnaturalforacouncilortotryto  
impresshisnameonvoterswhenalocalelectionisexpectedinthenear  
future．In such situationcontactwith voters for the sake ofhis Dietman  
is atthesametime a goodway ofpushinghimselfto theelectorate．  





a strict sense．On the other hand，the dissolution of the Lower House  
imnlediately after his election might discourage him from devoting 
himselftothe electioncampaignofhisDietman．   
Deve70pingsuchanargument，Ishikawapresentsaninterestinghypoth－  
esisabouttheinfluenceoflocalelection overnationalelection．InJapn，  
generallocalelectionisheldinthesprlngOfeveryfourthyear．Election  
OftheUpper HouseisheldinJulyorAugustofeverythirdyear．Every  
twelfth year，therefore，an Upper House electionis held only a few  
monthslaterthanagenerallocalelection．Thisapproximatesynchroniza・  
tion of different－1evelelections，aCCOrding toIshikawa，StimulatesIocal  
POliticians’activities to mobilize voters for candidates for the Upper  
House election，bringing higher turnout andincreasing votes cast for  
J6   
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COnSerVativecandidates‖）．ResultsofUpperHousee】ectionseemconfirm  
hisreasoning．   
The dataIshikawa usesis based on nation－Wide election results．But  
local－1eveldatamaybringusmorepreciseinformation．Speakingoflocal  




Onnationalelectiononthe municipalbasis，   
By the way，Curtis shows aview opposite toIshikawa’s and others’  
abouttimingeffect oflocalelection onnationalone．Accordingto him、  
local politicians tend to detach themselves from mobilizing voters for 
nationalpoliticiansinordertopreservetheirtimeandenergyasmuchas  
possible for their own sakewhen their own electionis coming shortly  
afteranationalelection12）．Hisviewshouldbeexaminedhere，tOO．   
Wegathered needed data from a】lthemunicipalities which hold off－  
generallocalelectioninKanagawa and Okayama，andgrouped munici－  
palitiesaccording to thelengthoftimebetweenlocalcouncilorelection  
and generalelection．Then we examined theincrease or decrease of  
COnSerVative votesin each generalelection compared to those h the  
previouselection．Wealsocomparedtheturnoutinangeneralelectionto  
thatofthepreviouselectionineachcategory．   
Tables9－1，9・2，10，1，andlO－2are the results of our examination．A  
glance at them tells us that there is no consistent tendency between 





a keireisu of a Dietman not necessarily because joinlngit directly  
increases the number of votes he obtains．   
Why，then，does acouncilorjoina keiretsu？Ourquestionnairesdonot  
t46   
11）MasumiIshikawa，ibid．，pp．175・186．  
12）GeraldCurtic，Elect；on Cbmz）aなnノ（砂a71eSeS小Ie（NewYork：ColumbiaUniversity  
Press．1969）、Ch9．  
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councilors are a bit exceptional in that they rely heavily on their 
Dietmen’sassistancefortheirrownvote・gatheringefforts，atleastintheir  
first elections，   
The second caseis simi1ar to the first one．Generally speaking，a  
nationalpolitician has manylocalnotables as his supporters．Social  
backgroundofthoselocalnotablesisnotsimple．Amongthem，OneWi11  
find owners of smalllocalcompanies，SuCCeSSfulshopkecpers，doctors，  
1cading members of young businessmen’s associations，eXeCutives of  
agriculturalcooperations，andso on．They areindispensable people for  
POliticianstoraisefundsandtomakctheirelectioncampaigneffective．  
Asin the case of assistants，SOme Of thoselocalnotables declare their  






themtojoin keiYetSuSOfnationalpoliticianswhomtheyhavesupported  
long．   
Thencomesthe persuasionorentreatybythecampofaDietman．As  
rnentionedabove，Dietmenusua11yhavestrongmotivationtoinvitelocal  
politicianstotheirkeiretsus，eXpeCtingassistanceinvoter・mObilization．A  
Jβ   
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newlyelectedcouncilorislikelytobeapproachedbynationalpoliticians，  
unlesshehasalready beentaintedwiththecolor ofsomecamp．  






his name on thelist of this side．   
Of course，there can be positive reasons for a councilor to join a  
keinねu．Somemayget attractedbythepersonalityofaDietman．Some  
othersmayfeelithonorabletoberelatedtoaninfluentialDietman．But  
moreplausibleis thecasewhere acouncilor findpragmaticbenefitsin  
JOlnlIlga々βZ柁ね〝．   
Oneofrolesexpectedofa councilorisoftenthat ofa consultant and  
Care－takerofbothindividualvotersandthecommunityorthevicinityas  
a wholeheissupposedtorepresent13）．Givensuchroleexpectation，hein  
usuallyaskedtodovariousthingsforthem．Butrequestsvotersbringhim  
arenotalwayswithinhisreach．Ifhecannothandlethemforhimself，he  
islikelytoseek assistancefrompersonswithwiderreach．Obviously，a  
Dietnlanisoneofthosewhoareveryhelpfultohim．Hecansendvoters  
tothe office of al）ietman，justlikea homephysiciansendshispatients  
Withseriousdiseasetoabighospital．Joiningakeirt）tSuisthebestwayof  
ObtaininghelpfromtheDietmanwheneveritisneeded．   
Thesecare－taking activities of a councilor areindispensable to keep  
VOterSSuppOrtinghim．Andifhecontributestotheresolutionofindividu－  
alvoter’s andcommunity’sproblemsbyhavingrecoursetohisDietman，  
thatwi11make his reputation among voters that much better．In this  
SenSe，joining a keiretsu has considerable slgnificancein terms of his  
electoralfortune．ButthatdoesnotmeanthatDietman’sassistancebrings  
himmanynewsupporters；Itisbasicallyexpectedtokeephisexisting  
144   
13）InJapan，COunCilorsareelectedonthewholecitybasis，nOtOrlthewardbasis．But   
COnSerVativecouncilorsusually obtainmostoftheirvotesfromaparticalarpart  
Of the mur）icipality called jimoIL）．A typicaljimolo contains a few blocks or・  
hamlets．  
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supportersfo1lowinghim．Inthissense，itmaybearguablethatkei柁tSuis  
a defensive device for a councilor．   
What we should be carefulaboutis，however，the simple fact that a  
Dietmancanbe usefulonlytothosecouncilorswhoneedhishelp．Some  
councilors of big citieslike Yokohama，for example，are able political  
entrepreneurs whohaveenoughresources andinformationto dealwith  
theirvoter・S’requests；Theyseldom need otherpolitician’shelp，In rur・al  
areas，Onthe otherhand，manyCOunCilorsreprcsent only afewhundred  
Orlessvoters．Theyarebasicallyrepresentativesofahamletorasrnall  
Clusterofhamlets，andaresupposedtohandovertheirseatsinthecouncil  
to the next person usually after their two－term SerVice，In such cases，  
COunCilorsdonotnecessarilyhavetobenervousaboutelectionas】ongas  
theyarevlgilantoverhowthcinterestsoftheirhamletsareconsideredby  
municlpalauthorities．   
A keiretsu among politicians from different levels can be seen as an 
associationofmutualassistance．Butwhatjsexpectedfromitdependson  
politicians．Thc fir・St thing a Dietman expects from his keiYetSuis the  
mobilizationofvoters．Almostallconservativepoliticianswhoarestand－  
1ng for nationalelection w川diligently form and maintain their own  
keiyeisu，eVeniftheimportanceofkeiYeisuinvoter－mObilizationhasbeen  
diminishing．Itis nationalpoliticians that make keireisu phenomenon  
ubiquitousinJapan．Councilors’concensaboutketntmontheotherhand，  
SeemS tO be rather passive．Itis certain that many of them find  
psychologicaland／orpragmaticalbenefitsinjoiningkeiYetSu．Butinterms  
oftheirownelections，thesignificanceofkeiYeisuisnotoutstanding．This  






thewar that keireisu becamewidespread alloverthe country．KeireねzJ  
WaSOnCeaVeryefficientdevicewhichprovidedconservativepoliticians  
20   
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Ofthenationallevelwithalotofvotes．Alongwithgreatchangesofthe  
Japnese society，the siginificance of keiretsuin electoralpolitics has  





manyofconucilorswhojoinkei柁由u arellOminalmembers．especiallyln  
ruralareas．RutsomeareardenttocontributetotheirleaderDietrnenby  
gathering votesinone way or anothcr．Today，the number of voters  
moved by their effortis smallcompared to the whole electorate．But  
those votes accumulated by councilors still can affect election results 
Seriouslyineachdistrict．Thisisthereasonthatnationalpoliticiansstick  
to the maintenance oftheir keirefsu．   
ThesplitofLDPinJuly．1993，hasnotweakenedsuchseriousconceI．n  
aboutkeireisuatall．Itiscertainthatsomeconservativelocalpoliticians  
gotembarrassed whenDietmentheyhadbeensupportingdefcctcdfrom  
theLDP．Butmostlocalpoliticiansstayedinthekei7VtSuWithwhichthey  
hadlongbeenaffiliatedwhentheirleaderDietmenleft LDPtojoinone  
Ofnewlyformedconservativeparties，theHarbingerPartyandNewLifc  
Party．Insomeprefectures，prefecture assemblymembersandmunicipal  
COunCilors defected from LDP en mass，following Dietmen they were  
SuppOrting．   
OnJanuary29，1994，theDietenacted alaw whichbrought a drastic  
Changeofelectionsystem．Instead ofso－Called multiseat－districtsystem  
with which thiscountry hasbeen fami1iar since1925，the next general  
electionistobeheldwithastrangecombinationofproportionalrepresen－  
tative system and single－member－district system．Of500HR seats，300  
Willbechosenfromsinglememberdistricts．   
Doesthischangeofelectionsystemleadtoscrapkeiretsu，high1ighting  
thecompetitionamongpoliticalparties，nOtCandidates？Thenewelection  
SyStem Willchange the present configuration of some ten parties，and  
make voters more sensitive to partylabels．At a glance，this situation  
SeemStOdeprivetheraisund’c［reforkeiretsuwhichhasthrivedunderthe  
multiseat－districtsystem・In theshort run，however，things aregolngtO  
2J  
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the oppositedirection．   
Nodoubtmostofthepresent HRmembersareeagertobere－elected  
inthenextgeneralelectionwhichwi11probablybeheldin1995．Inthis  
election，eaCh candidatein a districtwi】1be supposed to be the only  
representativeofhisparty，Itisunpredictableatthismomenthowmany  
Partiesfight for seatsin the eTection，Butitis almost certain that any  






having their ability，in voter－mObilization though restricted，inmind．Of  
COurSe，neW districtswi11require some reorganization of keiretsu．But  
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??? 39．4  37．1  37．7   
48．3  46，6  48．5  
11．3  12．9  11．7   




100．0  100．0  100．0  100，0  100．0  
46  120  203  442  811  
m＝mi）1ion，t＝thousand  
Tableト2 Kanagawa Prefccture  
populationsizeofmuniclpalities  










total（射  100．0 100．O  






5．T如扇   
Effect ofthe Lengthin Serviceasa Councilor  
I39  
Table2－10kayama Prefecture  
1engthinservice  
んりりJんJ′   
affiliation in thelst inthe2nd  3rd term  
term  term   ＆longer  
NA average  
56．1  37．7   
36．8  48．5   
5．3  11．7   








total（％）  100．O  
N  215  
100．0  100．0  100．0  




Table 2-2 Kanagawa Prefecture 
lennth in service 
ん■りJんイブ  
affiliation in thelst inthe2nd  3rd term  





POStholders  33，6  43．O  
mereJOiners  39．7  31．6  
non－JOlnerS  22，4  18．4  
0thers，NA  4．3  7．0  
47．   60．0   
32．0  20．0   
15．5  10．0   
5．2 10．0  
???????????????
toしal（％）  100．0  100．O  
N  l16  114  
100．0  100．0   







FrequencyoftheContactwith Diet Members  
138   
Table3－10kayama Prefecture  
participationin   
frequency  









more a month   
SeVeraltimes  
Or  
mOre a year  
Seldom  
NA  
1．3  2．1  5．9  2．2  
53．4  21．1  
40．5  72．6   
4．8  4．2  
47．1  56．9  
41．2  37．9   
5．9  4．1  
total（％）  100．O  
N  306  
100．0  100，0   
17  811  
100．0  100．0   
393  95  
Table32 KanagawaPrefecture  
participationin   
frequency  









more a month  
severaltimes  
Or  
mOre a Vear  
seldom  
NA  
3．3  1．2  0．0  4．6  7．6  
51．3  37．5  
42，0  45．0  
3．3  16．2  
57．7  56．4  
23．1  31．5   
19．2  7．5  
total（％）  100．O  
N  198  
100．0  1（）0．0  
150  8∩  
100．0  100．0  
26  454  
25  
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Prevalence ofVoter－mObilization Activlty  
Table4－10kayama Prefecture  
POpulationsizeofmuniclpalities  prevalence of 
lnobilization ＜1m 150t－1m 30t－150t lOト30t  10tく  avel－age  
most have  
such influence 
about a half  
have  
some of them  
have  
non of them  
don’t know  






26．2  31，2   
15．2   16，0   
34．6   32．3  
19．9  16．6  4．3  11．7  15．3   
0．0  3．3  1．5  
0．0  2，5  0．5  








?? 100．0  
442  
m＝million，t＝thousand  
Table4－2 Kanagawa Prefecture  
prevalence of pOpulationsizeofmuniclpalities  
mobilization く1m150t1m 30L150t lO卜30t lOt＜  ?????? ???
1110St have  
such influence 
about a half  
have  
some of them  
have  
non of Lhenl  








?????70．6   










16．2  13．9  12．8  
??????????? ???????? ?????? ???????????????
total（％）  
N  fil 
m＝milljon，t＝thousand  
26   
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Table5L10kayama Prefecture  
prevalence oi perCentageOfagriculture，forestry・andfishing  
mobilization く5％ 5－10％10L20％ 2030％ 30％＜ average   
most have  
such influence 
about a half  
have  
some of them  
have  
non of them  
don’t know  
other answers  
NA  
50．0   36．2   28．9   
17．0  18．5  15，9  
21．0  31．2   
13．1   16．0   
41．6  32．3  
21．5  16．6  
?????????????????????
17．7  
????????? ????????????? ???????? ???????????????（??
Table5p2 Kanagawa Prefecture  
prevalence of perCentageOfagriculture，forestry・andfishing  
mobilization  く5％ 510％10－20％ 20－30％  3 く average  
most have  
such influence 
abouL a half  
have  
some oi them 
have  
non of them  
don’t know  
other answers  
NA  
44，4   31．4   23．1  44．4   
22．6  18．1  13．5  16．7   
17．9   34．3   40．4   22．2  
11．1  15．2  17．3  11．1  
39．0  
20．3   
24．4 
2．8  







???????? ‖「 ??「 ????????? ?
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RclationshipbetweenVoter・mObilizationActivitiesandthePercentageof  
the LDP Votesi1983UH PR Election  
Table 61 Okayama Prefecture 
prevalence of perCentageOftheL上）Pvotes  
mobilization lO－15％15ZO％ 20－25％ 2530％ 30％＜ average  
most have  
such influence 
about a half  
have  
some of them 
IlOn Of ther】1  
don’t know  
Other answers  
NA  
60．9   37．8   Z9．8   31．8  13．9   31．2   
17．4  16．9  16．0  14．8  17．7  6．0   







Table 6-2 Kananawa Prefecture 
percentageofthe LDPvotes  prevalence of  
mobilization  1015％1520％ 2025％ 25v30％ 30％＜ average  
most have  
such influence 
about a half  
have  
some of lhem 
non of them 
don’t know  
other answers  
NA  
43．1  31，1  23．3  
22．0   13．2  












total（％）  100．0 100．O  
N  318  106  
2β  
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Table7－10kayama Prefectre  
populationsizeofmunlClpalities  
150t1m  30卜15Ot lOt30t lOt＜   
average number 
of votes   
number of  
respondenents－  
888．9  321．1  
36  84  
134．1   102．8  
159  344  
＊Thentlmbem ofrespondentswhoprovideduswithconcretefigures．  
m二million，t二t，housand  
Table7－2 Kanagawa Prefectre  
POPulationsizeofrnunicIPalities  
150卜1n1  30t－150t lOt－30t lO亡く  
average number 
of votes   
number of  
respondenents雷  
4，240．5   937．2  559．3  
37  98  74  
268，4  154．7  
112  324  
＊ThenumbemofrespondentswhoprovideduswithconcreLe figures，  
m＝mi11ion，t＝thousand  
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LDP C－TNDEPEN■ JSP CGP DSP JCP   





and organizations  







other factor  
NA  
24．0  24．1  
9．5  6．0  
36．1  3R．6  
27．4  28．0   
0．0  0．0  
0．0  0．0  
0．3  0．0   
0．7  1．2   
2．0  2．1  
12．0  3．2 14．3  7．6  
4．0  3．2  0．0  0，0  
60．0  67．7  71．4  28，8  
18．0  1．6 （）．0 12．1   
6．0 21．0  0，0 43，9   
0．0  0．0  0．0  0．0  
0．0  0．0  0，0  0．0   
0．0  〔）．0  7．1  3．0   
0．0  3．2  7．1  4．5  
total（％）  
N  
100．O  100．0   
296  515  
100．0 100．0 100．0 100．0   
50   62  12   66   
＊C－INr）EPENmeansconservativeindependents  
＊＊p－aSSemmeanSprefectureassembly  
．‘iり   
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Table82 Evaluation by Councilors Themselves（Kanagawa Prefec－  
ture）  
I32  
Party Affiliation  
Contributor  










help and aid of 
Oietmen  
helpandaid of  
membersofp－aSSem＋＋  
othcr factor   
NA  
24▲8  24＿0  
9．3  3．6  
43．4  41．2  
19．4  19．7   
0．8  0．0   
0．0  0．0  
0，口  0．0   
0．0  0．4   
2．3  1．1  
22．5  5．1  8．3  3．1  
3．4  0．0  5．0  0．0  
58．4  70．4  73．3 14．1  
9．O l．0  8．3  0．0   
5．6  22．4  5．0  78．1   
0．0  0．0  0．0  0．0  
0．n O．0  0．0  0．0   
1．1  0．0  0．0  1．6  
0．0  ト0  0．0  3．1  
total（％）  
N  
100．0  10（）．O  
129  279  
100．0 100．0 100．0 100．0  
89   98   60   64   
＊C－INr）EPENmeansconservativeindependents  
＊＊paSSemmeanSprefectureassernbly  
3J   
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TimingcffectofLocallミ1ectionsonGeneralElections  
Table91Effect onturnout（Okayama and Kanagawacombined）  
time lag from the 
IleareSt COunCilor  
yearofgeneralelection  





in the samc m  6．20  
131Ilbehind  【11．07  
46m behilld  p4．64  
612m behi11d  －0．34  
12y behind  l．71  
12）7ahead  －0．70  
612m ahead  －9．72  
46m ahead  l．35  
13m allead  －2．39  
【8．21  
（7） n8．50  
（1） 【7．77  
（7） －2（）．86  






87（19）  5．13  
00（12j →4．97  
53（3） －1．28  









average（％）  一2．39（115）  11．92（115） －12．70（115） 1．78（115）   
＊m＝mOntll，y＝year  
＊＊The numbermunicipalitiesthatheldcouncilorelectiotlSareShown h paTenthL  
eSeS．  
Table9〈2 Effectontheporformanceoftheconservativecamp：COnSer－  
Vative votescompared tothe wholeelectorate．  
（Okayama and Kanagawacorrlbined）  
timelagfromthe  yearofgeneralelection  
nearest councilor  
e】ection  1979  19錮  1983  
in thcsamem  l，45（3）  
卜3m behind  ¶8．45（5）  2．28（  
4－6Illbelli】1d  ¶3▼（）7（48）  3．68（  
6・1Zrllbehilld  →0．47（1け）  4．75（  
12ybehiIld  3．19（19）15う5（  




7） －6．36  
1） 】6．32  
7） －16．33  
64）  －3．19  





612Ⅰれahead  、7，63（2）  3＿55（12） －1．12  
46m ahead  l．21（7） 一0．86（3） －1．97  
13m aIlead  h5．18（1）  7．62（2） 一6．29  
average（％）  ～1．33（115）  9牒0（115） －10．04  
＊m＝mOnth，y二year  
＊∴＊TheIlumber municIPalitiesthatheldcouncilorelections areshownin pdrenth－  
eSeS．  
．■J二l   
川十品／．．石川ヾJ叫一人高・．川／h／．1J一〃ご／い1t川，イ1／J川J‘万．J／（、．り仙イ／．り＝、′㌧／・小川  
TimingeffectoflocalelectionsonUH election  
I30   
TablelO＾1Effect on turnout（（）kayama andKallagaWa COmbined）  
time lag from the 
nearest councilor  
electioIl  
year ofgeneralelection  
19Rn  1983  
in the same m  
1 3m behind 
46m behind  
6－12m behind  
l2ybehiIld  
12yahead  
612m ahead  
4 6m ahead 

























average（％）  ■3．77（115） 4．31（115） －19．26（115）16．15（115）   
＊m＝mOnth，y＝year  
＊＊The number of municipa】itien that held councilor elec〔ions are shDWnin parL  
entheses．  
TablelOL2 Effect ontheperformanceofthcconservativecampinUH  
election：COnSerVativevotescomparedtothewholeelectora－  
te．（Okayama and Kanagawacombined）  
time lag from the 
nearest councilor  
election  
yearofgeneralelectjon  
198（）  1983  1986  
iIlthe same m  
ト3m behind  ▲6．80  
46rn behind  －7．18  
6－12m behirld  MO．11  
12ybehind  l．35  
ト2y ah（⊃ad  ∽2．83  
6」2m ahead  －10．11  
4－6m ahead  －11．57  
ト3m ahead  O．56  
（7） 一15．89  
（l） 仏12．89  








97（64） －16＿04  
53（19） 15，51  
94（12） －15．25  
57（3） －21．46  










??average（％）  －3．30  〉16，03  
＊Tn＝mOnth，y＝year  
＊＊ThenumberofrnしInicipaliticsthatlleldcounci】orelectionsareshowninparenth－  
eSeS．  
．フ、－ブ  
